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ABSTRACT
The public policy benefits

that parties-deliver

are

allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to
majority
Majority—ru1e decision making, however, does not

rule.

lead to consistent policy choices; it is "unstable."
paper, we argue that institutions

coalitions

--

organization.

can be

-—

In this

and thereby policy

stabilized by extra-legislative

The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S.

House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued

membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a

variety

of key structural

matters.

_Because_membership in the

majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a

bond,

the

posting of which stabilizes the structure of the House, and hence
the policy decisions made in the House.

We examine the rules of

the House Democratic Caucus and find that they do in fact contain
the essential elements of an effective, extralegisaltive

mechanism.
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bonding

. INTRODUCTION

l

Why do political parties exist and persist in democratic

societies?_
general

The existence question would seem to be one of a more

class

of questions that includes "why are there business

firms?", "why are there public bureaucracies?", "why are there
armies?"

one general answer is

solve collective

dilemmas:

that all these organizations help

they overcome bad incentives (such as

those in the Prisoner's Dilemma) and strategic uncertainty (as in
the Battle of the

Sexes).1 Firms

can thus produce more widgets

than can freely contracting agents transacting in the market;
armies can produce more
forth.

Why not a

force_than

similar

story for

the

sum of their parts: and so

political

parties, one

The standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes
stories each involve two players, each choosing between two
possible actions. The prisoner's dilemma story goes something
like the following. The two players are suspects in a burglary
being interrogated separately. The interrogators offer each
suspect the following deal: turn state’s witness against your
partner, and you will go free. If neither confesses, both will be
convicted of a lesser charge of trespassing. If both confess,
however, both will be convicted of the more serious, original
charge. Thus, the dilemma: both players hope the other does not
confess, but both have incentives to confess rather than keep
quiet. Thus, by acting in their own "best" interests, both will
confess and be punished for burglary. -Battle of the Sexes, on
the other hand, poses a coordination problem for a man and a
woman trying to decide how to spend an evening together. The man
most prefers to go to a ball game, while the woman wants to go to
the opera. But neither wants to go alone to his or her preferred
option. In both cases, the players would like to have a means of
coordinating their individual choices to get a better outcome: a
mafia boss promising to kill both burglars if either confesses,
or a priest who makes the couple alternate between his preferred
activities and hers or be damned to hell for all eternity, for
example.
1.

.

whereby they produce more "public policy
benefits" than could
their members acting atomistically?
The primary problem with applying

this

logic to

_

political

parties is that the public policy benefits that
parties deliver
are ultimately allocated by the democratic
procedures of the
state. The.generic procedures that legislatures use to
make

decisions, however, do not lead to consistent policy choices.
They are "unstable", in the parlance of social
choice theory, as
a series of "instability theorems" have
demonstrated.2 These
theorems make the persistence of parties seem problematic.
They
seem to predict ever-shifting majority
coalitions, with each new
majority coalition implementing a
policy.

different

The

best-known

rejoinder to the instability theorems insofar

as they apply to majority rule institutions, such as

legislatures, is embodied in the notion

ofla structure—induced

equilibrium, first introduced in studies of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987).

‘The

basic idea is that House decisions are rarely made by a process
that looks like pure majority-rule on the floor.

Instead, there

are structures and procedures that constrain both the range of
The spatial modelling literature has demonstrated that in a
series of pairwise votes, any policy that garners majority
support in a test against the status quo policy can itself be
defeated in a subsequent pairing with at least one other policy,
and so on. Thus, there is no global "winner" among the range of
possible policy choices, and hence no preference-induced policy
stability (McKelvey 1976: Schofield 1984). In fact, this
instability result applies not just to majority rule but to all
2.

non-collegial decision rules (Schofield 1980; Cox 1984: Schwartz
1982). We shall speak in the text only of majority
rule,

however.

feasible alternatives, and the order in which policy options are
paired with each other.

one such institutional

structure

is an

array of committees endowed with the ability to veto legislation

in their respective jurisdictions.

Another is the right of a

central authority, the Speaker, to set the agenda.

These

structural departures from majority rule, it is argued, stabilize

policy choice.
The most important

criticism of

the structure-induced

equilibrium approach, due to Riker (1980), is that institutions
are not exogenous.

social choice.
to different

They are endogenous —- i.e., a matter of

In Riker’s

view, if different "structures" lead

policy choices,

choice over structures will
over policies.

then people will anticipate this;

inherit the

instability of

choice

Riker's critique has pushed the question in the

literature back one step.

Are equilibrium-inducing institutions

themselves subject to majority-rule instability?

one might opine

that the rules by which structures are

chosen and modified are non—majoritarian, so that majoritynrule

instability in the choice of structures is empirically

irrelevant. ‘The U.S. House of Representatives’ standing rules,
for example, stipulate that the standing rules of the House can

be changed (once adopted by majority

rule)

only by unanimous

consent, by more than 2/3 of its members voting to suspend the
rules (and then a majority voting to amend the standing rules),
or pursuant to a report from the Rules Committee.

This is not

majority rule,

and

serves to entrench the standing rules, and

policy deals based on those
I

rules.3

But can the House commit itself to obeying
its own rules

regulating how its rules are to change?
argument

is the

claim that they cannot.

Implicit in Riker's
It goes something like

the following.

The constitution gives Congress full power
to
make its own rules. If a majority wished to
change the rules

entrenching the rules, they could (by majority rule)
override any
points of order and proceed to do just that.
How can one escape this trap?

There appear to us to be

three main routes, not necessarily mutually
exclusive or

exhaustive.4 First,

Shepsle (1986)

_ assumes

notes

that Riker's argument

a one—tc—one and certain mapping of rules
into policy.
If this mapping is not one—to-one, or
not certain, then

preferences over rules might not
preferences

over

policy.

set up a repeated game.

inherit the instability of

Perhaps rules, if entrenched, merely
We know there will be multiple

I

equilibria in such games, with widely differing
equilibrium
3. The rules entrenching the standing
rules
a bit more stability: 2/3-majority rule is actually induce only
stable in two
dimensions, but not in higher-dimensional spaces.
‘See Greenberg
(1979) Schofield (1986).

,

4. A fourth route, which we do not take up
in the text, argues
the substantive point: that, in fact, House rules
are not
ultimately subject to lex partis majoris.

policy outcomes

possible.5 Thus,

before any

particular

set of

rules has been chosen, there might be strategic uncertainty

regarding which equilibrium will be chosen.
rules,

however,

The status quo

already have been chosen, and the equilibrium

selection stage has already been passed.

Thus, the uncertainty

attached to the status quo rules is substantially less than the

uncertainty attached to alternative, as—yet—untried rules.
the extent that legislators are

To

risk-averse, then, the status

quo

rules will be favored.
A second way around Riker’s dilemma might arise from

transactions costs.

If creating a winning coalition is costly,

than already-formed coalitions will be stabilized

potential

defectors must pay a cost

coalition

——

to

assemble

because

a new winning

so the policy benefits gained by defection must

exceed the coalition-formation costs in order to be worth the
effort.
We already know, from the work of Sloss (1973), that

adding

transactions costs to the basic spatial model can in principle
produce structurally stable cores.

For example, if the

configuration of ideal points is "close" to the one of the
razor’s edge cases necessary for a preference-induced

5. This follows from the "Folk Theorem," which states,
basically, that any strategy combination in a repeated game that
provides better payoffs to players than would arise from
repeatedly playing the equilibrium strategy for the single-shot
game, is sustainable as an equilibrium. See, e.g. Rasmusen. In
other words, basically any observable outcome can reflect
"equilibrium" behavior in an infinitely repeated game. This
result suggests that the real strategic problem facing players in
repeated games, such as the prisoner's dilemma, is how to get
coordination on "better" equilibrium strategy combinations.

equilibrium, then even "small" transactions
costs will be
sufficient to preserve the status quo,
because the small policy
benefits that could be attained by
overturning the status quo arenot worth the costs of legislating
(opportunity costs,
negotiating costs, collective action costs).6
If one focuses on the negotiating

and collective action

costs of legislating, the point might
be put this way: there is
always a collective action problem
which must be solved before
the instability inherent in the
structure of preferences can be

manifested.

If that collective action problem
can be made more

difficult

by those preferring the status
quo, then the costs of
legislating may be particularly high
although

--

leads away from what.are

usually

this observation

thought of as

transactions

costs.
In this paper, we focus on a
third way in which institutions
might be stabilized: one in which
stability is enforced by

extra—legislative organization and
bond-posting. If a subset of
legislators were all "bonded" by
membership in a valuable and
extra-legislative group, such as a political
party, and if the

cost of

giving

up the bond were expected to
exceed most

realistically imaginable benefits from defection,
then
6. While the stabilizing properties
of transactions costs are
widely admitted, noone is very satisfied
with transactions costs
as a general reason for stability.
A frequent complaint is that
they can "explain anything": if one
the transactions costs were high: if observes stability, claim
costs must have been low. Without anone observes change, the
independent measure of
transactions costs case by case, how would
one know? Another
complaint is that transactions costs
enter
(in many models, not
just Sloss’) as an exogenously
posited, rather than endogenously
derived, cost.

legis1ators"choices over structure (and hence policy) might

therewith be-stabilized.

our thesis is

that the rules of the

Democratic

Caucus in the

House of Representatives dictate that all members of the

Caucus‘

are bound, if they wish to retain their membership, to support
Caucus

decisions in the House on a variety of key structural

matters

e- such as the election of the Speaker and the design and

staffing of the committee system.- To the extent that membership

in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it constitutes a
bond, the posting of which stabilizes key features of the
structure of the House, and hence key features of the policy
‘decisions made in
for

congressional

the

House.

This

notion,

implications
primary topic of

and its

structure and policy, are

the

this essay.

2.

The Party Bond
There are two types of assets that Mes place in bond

their party colleagues:

mith

electoral benefits (i.e., things that

directly help members win reelection) and intra-legislative
benefits (i.e., things that increase the value of the

seat).

We

consider each type of asset.
It is best to start with the

intra—1egislative assets

since

these are clearer and are presupposed in the discussion of
electoral assets.

The "intra-legislative asset" bond that a

member posts consists of all party-specific investments that the

member

makes.

one example is

committee that a member makes.

the investment of time on a
Such an investment endows the

member with human capital

contributors

-— whose

—-

contacts, knowledge, lists of

value would decline were the member

transferred to another committee. It also endows the
member with
seniority on the committee. Were a member expelled
from the
Democratic caucus, she would automatically lose her
Democratic
committee assignments, hence all accrued
seniority,

Democratic

all committees.

Neither

committee—specific

committee-specific

seniority

on

human captial nor

is readily transferable to other

uses should the member be expelled from
the party, hence from
party—contingent committee assignments.

Whether or not an expelled member suffers a net
seniority
loss or is unable to use all
committee—specific

depends,

of

course, on

her
events subsequent

human

to her

capital

expulsion. ‘If

the member becomes an independent,
prospects for good committee
assignments are rather poor, and the gross
loss suffered upon
forfeiture of the "seniority bond" and of the

"committee-specific

human capital bond" will probably turn into
a net loss as well.
If the member can gain admittance to the
other party's

caucus,

she may be able to secure positions on
her old committees with
seniority in the new party
comparable to that in the old. In
this case, her
and human capital bonds have

seniority

still been

forfeited but the other party has offered a
compensating "signing
bonus". Even with a signing bonus, however, a
departing member

of the majority party will probably
be worse off, unless his or
her new
a majority.

party attains

Another bond that each member posts within his
party is the

sum total of

"uncollected party-contingent IOUs".

If as a junior

member Ihave worked harder than my current "wages"

justify, then perhaps as a

disproportionate influence

alone

would

senior member Iwill exercise
(of. Becker and Stigler 19?4).

In the

meantime, the prospect of a payoff that is contingent on
continued

good standing

the pale of the party.

in the Democratic

Caucus keeps me

within

Alternatively, if Ihave cut a deal

within the majority party that delivers a stream of benefits over
several years, then fear of forfeiting this stream of benefits
keeps me in line.

Another kind of intralegislative bond, one that pertains

only to the majority party, is the sum total of all advantages of

majority status.
staff

For example, on most committees

outnumber minority—party

staff by at

sometimes by as much as 4 to 1.

least

majority-party_
i

2'to

1 and

Expulsion from the majority

party carries with it loss of a variety of such perquisites.

The

minority party, even if it accepts a majority-party expellee as a

member, cannot credibly offer to recreate these perquisites.
As regards electoral assets, the bond that a member posts is

the expected electoral

loss that

she would suffer upon expulsion

from the party caucus._

Why.would a member anticipate electoral

losses upon expulsion?

There are at least two reasons.

First, being expelled from the

party

caucus reduces the

probability that the member will secure his party's nomination at
the next election.

The local party hierarchy may have ties to

the national organization which influence their support for the
expelled member.

investment,

Contributors may find the legislator a poorer

if she has been stripped of her assignments with her
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original party and failed to find fully
comparable ones as an
independent or with the other party.
Potential

intraparty

challengers may seize upon expulsion as a
primary election
campaign issue.7

Second,

if the member does lose the party label,
her
reelection prospects may be considerably
lessened. Certainly
this is true if she fails to secure the
nomination of the other
major party:

the number

of

members who win seats in Congress as

independents has declined to virtually
zero (Schlesinger 1985)."
But even if the member is in a position
to switch between the
major parties (and few are), the process
is not a simple or
riskless one. Ex ante, reelection under a
new label has many
more imponderables_than reelection
the old label. Thus,
the distribution of party
orientation in the

under

member's electoral

district, or the

expected

label, acts as an

defectors.

extra-legislative barrier to

It is a cost that any new

promise to legislate away.

due to the

difficulty of running under

exit for potential

majority cannot credibly

We think this external

inertial behavior

a new

of voters and the

stabilization

associated value

of the party label is an_important
reason why modern political
parties (post-universal
suffrage) have been more stable than the

shifting factions of
7.

pre-modern

polities.

This line of influence is much
clearer and stronger in a
system such as the U.K., of
course. Expulsion from
a British party’s caucus leads
with virtual certainty to
deselection, and the prospects of joining the other
party are not
good. Nonetheless,
several
Congress are extremely risk scholars have argued that members of
the same line of influence averse, so it might be inferred that
exists in the U.S. (Mann 1978;
Jacobson 1987).

parliamentary

ll

3.

Posting the Bond
In parliamentary

systems, a

government's threat to resign

if

defeated on a vote of confidence (resignation often being
followed by a dissolution of the legislature and new elections)

is a powerful force for the stability of government-brokered
logrolls.

The sequence of events in parliament is such that the

government

can, in essence, publically commit to resignation

before the vote.

Would—be dissidents are thus forced to consider

the merits of the government as a whole, rather than the merits
of the paritcular issue(s) at

stake.

The consequence of voting

against the

government,

confidence,

is not merely that an obnoxious bill or motion

after it has been declared a

defeated, but also that the

government

matter

of‘

is

resigns and perhaps

dissolves parliament: thus, the entire policy logroll that the
government has pushed is at risk of

unrave1ing.8

Majority parties in the U.S. Congress cannot compete with
parliamentary parties in the strength of incentives they can
marshall, but the logic of their design is in key respects the
same. The key logrolls of a U}S. majority party are
often
protected by the judicious allocation

of committee power (e.g.,

the dominance of organized labor on the Education
and Labor
8. In July 1993, Britain’s Conservative Prime
Minister, John
Major, was abandoned by a group of his own backbenchers
and
thereby defeated on the floor in his attempt to get the
House of
Commons to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (the treaty
for European
union) in its then—current form. Major called the
defectors’
bluff, making the vote a matter of confidence, and this time the
defectors returned to the fold, and the measure was passed.
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Committee; the required supportof the oil—depletion
allowance for
a Democratic assignment to Ways and
Means; the

dominance of

Interior Committee by

Westerners;

and the

dominance of

the

the

Acgriculture Committee by Members from
agricultural districts).
would-be dissidents are thus often faced

with structural

impediments (as, for example, the
Democratic Study Group was
faced with Judge Smith’s
obstructionism from his perch atop the
Rules Committee).
What is the

impediments?

consequence

of smashing or ignoring those

It is not merely that policy
is changed on one

issue in the desired direction.
equilibrium that the erstwhile

_into

question.

Instead, the entire policy

structure

supported is brought

The caucus rules recognize

these

wide policy

ramifications by stipulating the utlimate sanction-—expulsion—for members who fail to go along
with caucus recommendations
regarding key elements of House
structure. At least, this is our
interpretation of the Democratic
Caucus’ rules.
It may help to make the point
if we excerpt the relevant
caucus rules in stylized form:

Caucus Rule I: Caucus

members are obliged to vote with

the majority of the caucus
on specified House votes,
including (a) the election of the speaker
and the
allocation of committee positions among
majority party
members: (b) the adoption of key House rules;
and (c)
appeals of the Speaker’s
interpretations of House rules,

insofar as they affect either

(a) or (b).

Key house

13

rules are (i) those designating the powers of the

various positions in (a), such as the Speaker's agendasetting powers, the
of committee

agenda-setting powers

and subcommittee chairpersons, and the jurisdictions of
the

committees;

and (ii) those specifying how House

rules can be changed in the House (e.g., pursuant to a
report from the

majority—party dominated Rules

Committee).

Th

The actual rules of the Democratic caucus are fairly close to

stylized rule I. A long—standing rule of the Democratic Caucus
(found, for example, in rule 7 in the 95th Caucus and
in rule 3B

pin

the 101st) states:

"With respect to voting in the House for

Speaker and other officers of the House, for each

committee

chairman, and for membership of committees, a majority vote of
those present and voting at a Democratic Caucus shall bind
all
Members of the Caucus."

This rule tallies pretty closely

to

our

Rule I(a).

There is no equally explicit commitment to the "key"
standing_Ru1es of the House specified in

our Rule I(b).

But the

vote on adoption of the House rules is taken
immediately after

election of a Speaker and before

committee

assignments are handed

14

out:9

at least on

initial adoption there seem to be

incentives for majority party members to
proposed by their party, and

ample

support the rules

empirically the majority party

almost always does stick together on the
bulk of the Standing
Rules. We interpret the House Standing
Rules to be part of the
structure that Caucus members commit
themselves to support by

joining

the caucus.

Similarly, there is no explicit
declaration that caucus
members choosing to
their own speaker's interpretation
of, say, committee jurisdictions
or powers would

override

have done

anything contrary to caucus rules-

We

believe, nonetheless, that

9. In at least one
instance, the House did not follow its choice
of presiding officer with
an explicit adoption of rules.
was during the 51st
This

House (1389-1891), during which
the notorious
"Reed Rules" were first codified.
Without an explicit set of
is known as "ordinary
the case prior to the parliamentary procedure." Such is always
election of a Speaker.
By

a speaker.

tradition, the

"ordinary"

to pin down, since, of parliamentary procedure is quite difficult
course, members have not explicitly agreed
to just what is "ordinary"
and what is not. The Speaker of
the
51st House, Rep. Thomas B.
Reed (R-Maine) interpreted ordinary
parliamentary procedure to mean two things: first, that
the
to be pursuing dilatory
tactics; and second, that partis majoris
is absolute, i.e., that the
majority is_sovereign and can do
anything it pleases, regardless
of any precedent followed
prior Houses. Employing
these two principles of ordinary by
parliamentary practice, Reed inaugurated
the modern era
special rules to govern
the consideration of important of
through simple majority adoption
bills,
Through this device, and through of Rules Committee reports.
Reed’s assumption of the
authority to limit floor recognition
non-dilatory intentions, the majorityto members deemed to have
Republican party caucus
made it clear that it is the
majority
caucus that rules in the
House.
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such.support is indeed.expected of caucus members in

good

standing.10
Caucus Rule II: Failure to vote with

the caucus

majority on votes specified in Rule Ileads to
automatic expulsion from the caucus.

Until recently,

Democratic

Caucus rules specified that "any

member of the Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives

failing to abide by the rules governing the same shall thereby
automatically cease to be a member of the Caucus."
essentially our Rule II.

clause has been changed;

This

is

In recent Congresses, the expulsion

members

can be expelled only by a

2/3

vote in Caucus (Caucus Rule 1, 101st Congress).

10. one recent example of the importance of binding Caucus votes
concerns the demise of the once-powerful Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. Congress established the JCAE in 1946 as a joint
House and Senate committee charged with overseeing the
development and promotion of nuclear power. Prior to 1969 and
the passage of the New Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
policy-making_apparatus in the U.S. was biased in favor of
promoting nuclear power. Environmentalists and prospective
neighbors had few grounds on which to challenge proposed new
plants; pro—nuke members of Congress populated the JCAE.
However, opposition to nuclear power at the federal level became
firmly entrenched in the regulatory process via NEPA and the 1971
Calvert Cliffs decision. Nuclear power advocates lost their
privileged institutional position for good when, at the opening
of the 95th Congress, a coalition of anti-proliferation and
environmentalist Democrats was able to include the demise of the
JCAE in the rules of the House, passed by a straight party vote.
Since the dissolution of the JCAE, attempts to streamline the
regulatory process have failed to generate any steam.

16

Does this change

matter?11

We think the game that the

Caucus rules set up is not one in
which stability is created as
_in standard

structure—induced equilibrium

Caucus as a corporate

arguments.

Rather, the

indefinitely-lived entity attempts to

cheating by establishing a reputation
for toughness in
punishment decisions generally {of
which the decision
prevent

to expel is

the most severe).

With such a reputation, potential
defectors
are deterred, and the future stream
of benefits of successful
log-rolling accrued to
in the party. Without such

all

a

reputation, the lines in the sand drawn by
the Caucus rules are
worthless, and the Caucus has
value

little

in stabilizing House

structures, hence little value in achieving
structure-induced

eguilibria.12

Thus, it does'not really matter
Caucus
whether
rules specify automatic expulsion
or expulsion upon 2/3 vote.
What matters is its reputation
for toughness, since it is
continually playing something like Chicken
with its own factions.

the

11. An "automatic expulsion" grants
tremendous power to the
party leader, as the punishment is
meted
out "automatically" by
the leadership and is not
necessarily
subject
to an approval vote
by the caucus itself. A
member of the Caucus could, of course,
through conventional parliamentary
procedures, challenge the
expulsion decision by the
leadership.
majority support, then the expulsion isIf the challenge gains
Requiring a
two—thirds vote reduces this delegation rescinded.
of
authority
to the
leadership. Whether or not this makes expulsion
more or less
likely is another question.
12. The situation is similar
in an infinitely-repeated game.to entry deterrence by a monopolist
And, like a monpolist, the
Caucus may have to incur
short—term
losses
such as the
temporary loss of its majority status
~—
in
order
to establish
its reputation for toughness.

--
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Caucus Rule III: Caucus Rules (in particular, Rules I,
II and III) can be changed only by a) majority vote in

the Caucus upon recommendation from a committee

appointed by the party leadership, or b) extraordinary
procedure.

This is a rough paraphrase of the actual caucus rules.
Under normal parliamentary procedure (adopted in the 101st
Congress, for example, in Caucus Rule 8), the rules can be

changed only by two-thirds vote or by a majority after advance

notification.

Caucus rules 45 and 46 then amend parliamentary

rules, giving the Caucus chair and Committee
Study and

on organization,

Review authority to propose amendments to the rules,

which are then subject to approval by normal majority rule; in
the 101st Congress, for example, previous notice is defined in
Caucus Rule 45-B,

amend the

which

stipulates

that a member proposing to

Caucus Rules must provide twenty copies of the proposed

change.

Having reviewed the caucus rules, we can restate our point.
By

joining

the

majority party caucus, each

member publicly‘

promises to support key features of House organization and rules.
If these caucus rules were enforced

exogenously,

structure would be stabilized to some degree:

then House

"constitutional"

change of the House rules could be effected only by a group

comprising a majority of the caucus and a majority of the House.

This would mean that structural1y—induced policy eguilibria in

one- or two-dimensional spaces would not be subject to the
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"inherited" instability feared by Riker, although the

same

problem would loom for higher—dimensional
spaces (Cox and

Mcxelvey 1984; Tsebelis 1993}.

directly stabilized as a
stabilized

as

a policy

procedural

party would be

coalition and indirectly

coalition.

Of course, the majority

exogenously enforced.

The majority

party's

caucus rules are not

If they are obeyed it must be

is in the interests of legislators to obey
them.

because it

Thus, even if

the real caucus rules are reasonable
facsimiles of our stylized

ones, there still remains the question of
enforcement. In
particular, why is the majority caucus’ threat of
expulsion ever
credible when it involves a pivotal defection?

4.

ARE THE RULES CREDIBLE?

DOES THE CAUCUS BLINK?

Let us suppose that membership in the Democratic
Caucus of the
U.S. House really is valuable and that caucus
rules specify that

any member violating the structure of the House as
set up by the

majority party will be expelled.
rules will

be

Will anyone believe that the

enforced in the event of a pivotal defection?

not, than pivotal

defections,l3

which

are

If

the only ones that

really matter, will not be deterred——and caucus rules
will do

little to entrench the House's structure.

13.

the

By "pivotal," we mean any group whose defection would strip
party of its majority.
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To pose the question a bit more precisely, suppose that a

.pivotal minority in the majority party wants to move policy on a
particular dimension to some new point but are prevented from

doing so

by

an ex ante veto exercised by the members of some

committee (in cahoots, let us say, with the majority party
leadership, so that it is not simply a matter of discharging the
committee).

If the pivotal group makes common cause with the

Republicans to circumvent whatever bits of structure need

circumventing, and then change the policy as they desire, the
loyal members of the majority caucus are presented with a fait

accompli.

They can either expel the dissidents, thereby losing

their majority, or gulp loudly, forgive.and forget.
the dissidents

feel

confident that the caucus

Why do not

will

choose the

latter path?
An analogous question arises in parliamentary systems.

Why

do not pivotal dissidents call the Prime Minister's bluff, voting

against the government on a matter of confidence?

After

all,

they may calculate that after the vote the government will decide

that continuing in office is better than carrying out a painful

threat.

Indeed, there are those in the literature who argue

against the importance of threats of resignation and dissolution

on the grounds that both are more painful for the frontbenchers

issuing the threat than for the backbenchers receiving it.
One answer in both cases hinges on reputation.

The

-government in a parliamentary system, if it publicly commits

t0

resignation upon defeat, pays a substantial penalty if it then
changes its mind afterwards (even in systems where such changes
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of mind are not illegal).

Similarly, the Democratic Caucus has

made a very public commitment to expel (or discipline) members
who fail to support the key features of House structure which

undergird the party's logrolling abilities.

If it backs down

easily, its credibility evaporates and its utility as an
organization diminishes substantially.

In particular, the value

of holding office as a leader of the organization would

diminish-

-suggesting that it is the current leadership, with an eye to the
future value of their posts, who push for enforcement of caucus

rules.
But one might reasonably ask-how a reputation for toughness

can be established against pivotal groups.

U.s.

Congressional

groups

In

twentieth-century

history, there are no instances

being expelled,

of pivotal

or even of pivotal groups leaving their

party——as, say, the Hata-Ozawa group left the Japanese Liberal
Democrats.

So how can a reputation for toughness be established?

We think the answer has to do with the full range of punishments

that

the

party leadership can hand out.

If non—pivotal groups

are punished, possibly with sanctions less severe than expulsion,
then members of a prospective dissident group will be

with the group’s unity of purpose and pivotalness.
them be punished?

Will they present a

punishment of any of their number?

united

can a

concerned

Will some of

front against

subset of them be

bribed to stay with the party, leaving the others non—pivota1 and
vulnerable to punishment?
There are also the kinds of question that arise in any kind
of rebellion.

Is it safe for a member to communicate his desire
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to overthrow the House structure to another member of his party?
The obvious strategy for the party leadership, upon

such communication,

hearing of

is to punish the would—be rebellion

This suggests that only rebellions based on fairly

organizer.

homogeneous pre—existing groups

Republicans

-—

e.g., midwestern Progressive

can get off the ground.

Another consideration that may enhance the credibility of
the caucus as a protector of the procedural status quo has to do

with the value of the party label in elections.

Suppose a

pivotal group within the majority party runs roughshod over those
aspects of the House rules that the caucus rules attempt to

entrench.

caucus
meets to

Suppose the

group but the caucus

rules "automatically" expel the

consider

whether the

rules

really

apply (or, alternatively, whether to reinstate the expelled

members without prejudice).

In such a

case, the loyalist members

of the caucus (assume either that they meet without the

dissidents or constitute a sufficient majority of the

caucus

to

do whatever they want} may fear the electoral consequences of

reinstatement.

For example, they may feel that reinstatement

would constitute acquiescence to the policy change against which
the loyalists voted.

To the extent that the policy

electorally salient, this would lower

is

the probability

of

reelection of all loyalists, for the same reason that voting for
the policy change would have.

Thus, if caucus members are purely

office—motivated, the loyalists will in fact have a credible
threat: it will be in their own immediate electoral interests to
vote against reinstatement (or to vote for expulsion).

If caucus
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members also value policy

offices within the

situation

House

intrinsically, and value internal

and party, as we assume they do, the

is much more complicated.

But at least we can say that

the reelection component of each loyalist member's
motivation
argues for expulsion.

Finally, it may be that the caucus rules are efficacious
not
so much because they are credibly enforced
but rather because
they serve an informational role.

The causus rules draw a "line

in the sand," that clearly defines which types of
behavior are in
and out of bounds. How this might work is
suggested by some
recent work by

Diermeier (1993). .Simp1ifying greatly, Diermeier
argues that a committee system is stabilized
not because the
House

can credibly commit to give certain committees

special

privileges (e.g., closed rules on the floor) but because
committee incentives to specialize -— which specialization
assumed to reduce uncertainty for all legislators

is

-- would be

destroyed were the floor ever not to defer to the
committee's

recommendations.14

Anticipating this destruction of incentives

to specialize, and valuing the

reduction in uncertainty brought

by specialization (all legislators are assumed
risk averse),

the

floor honors its committees’ recommendations (see also Shepsle
and Weingast 1979). This argument applies
generally to any

committee system--one set up by parties, as in Legislative
14. The committee, in other words, plays a
trigger strategy
against the floor: it provides the
benefits of specialization to
all, as long as the floor allows it policy rents (by
deferring to
its recommendations); but it refuses to specialize
forevermore if
the floor violates its expectations once.
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Leviathan, or one set up by non—partisan self—selection, as in
other parts of the literature.

To the extent

convincing, it suggests that the committee

that

it is

system-cum-Speaker

that the majority party sets up will be stable.
In

Congress,

committees frequently have their handiwork

amended, or even undone, on the floor.

How can one tell

which

amendments are minor and which ought to trigger a specialization

strike by members of the_offended committee?
the caucus pays its committees not directly

instead in structural prerogatives.

one answer is

that

in policy rents but

If all agents play within

the rules of the game, then specialization continues apace, even

if a committee occasionally

gets

rolled.

But if

miscalculates

"revolutionary"

floor preferences and

or "unconstitutional" action

is taken, then incentives to specialize are eroded because
structural advantages-—which can be parlayed into policy rents-—
are no longer credible.

5.

Conclusion
The social choice

literature

shows that, under fairly broad

circumstances, policy choices made under the method of majority
decision

are unstable.

This means that, for any chosen policy,

there exists at least one alternative that can command a majority
when placed against the original policy in a pairwise vote.
Shepsle

(1979) and Shepsle

and Weingast (1987) respond to this

finding by showing that procedural rules and structures, by
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putting agenda control into the hands of specific

members, can

induce stable majority choices over policy alternatives.

Shepsle

and Weingast (1987) and Weingast and Marshall (1988)

have further argued that House members have created a

decentralized

agenda-control system in

discrete jurisdictions make

which committees with

sophisticated

policy offers to the

whole House on policies in their respective jurisdictions.

House

committees are alleged to have both gate-keeping authority (they
decide whether an
to the reversionary policy will be

alternative

offered at all) and an ex post veto over changes to their
proposals (thus insuring committee members that they
cannot be

made worse off than the reversionary policy_by having made
an

initial

proposal).

House

committees,

the

argument

goes, then

engage in a "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" cooperative
logroll to pass legislation that makes members of each
committee

better off than if they did not propose new policies.
In Legislative

Leviathan, we argued that the majority party

caucus adds another layer of structure and process onto the

committee structure studied by Shepsle-Weingast and Weingast—

Marshall.

The majority party in the House achieves stable policy

outcomes by binding its members to support a specific structure
of agenda power

-- represented by the Speaker,

chairpersons, and the Rules Committee

—-

the committee

a structure which then

leads to committees choosing policies that, on average, benefit

majority party members more than minority party members.

We

emphasized the role of the Speaker in controlling access to floor

time

for the outputs of the various committees (the Speaker's
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veto over scheduling).

We largely agreed that much agenda

control is decentralized, as in the models of Shepsle—Weingast

and

Weingast-Marshall,

decentralized agenda

but argued

that the exercise of such

control was itself subject to regulatory

efforts by the party leadership and ultimately to restructuring

by the majority party's caucus.

If House rules were established exogeneously, then they
would induce stable policy

choices. The importance

"structure" would be transparent

-- and the

of

influence of party

members on outcomes would be obvious.
However, the rules are not determined exogenously.

Constitution merely

The

requires the House to choose a presiding

officer, stipulates that a

majority of

the membership constitutes

a quorum for doing business, and provides that "each house shall

determine the rules of its proceedings“ (Article I, Section 5:2).
In other words, the members make their own rules.

Thus, as Riker

has cautioned, referring to the policy consequences of

structure

merely pushes the instability problems of majorityvrule voting
back one step, from voting over

policy

options to voting over the

rules which establish agenda power and.hence condition policy

outcomes.

So how can one argue

that structures induce

equilibrium (more specifically, that

House rules do?)

We argue that House rules are entrenched by

caucus rules.

majority party

If the Democratic Caucus rules were to specify

exactly what we stylized them as saying in Rules I, II and III,

and were

exogenously enforced, then the argument for stability

would be almost a standard structure-induced equilibrium
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argument.

The only new wrinkles would be the appeal to
caucus

rules as the stabilizing element in the story and the
observation
that only a kind
"bicameral" stability would

of

be induced,

similar to that discussed in cox and McKe1vey (1984),
Hammond and
Miller (1937), and Tsebelis (1993).
We think in fact the game is more complicated and
more
reliant on transactions costs to induce stability.
That Caucus
members by their membership commit to support key
features of
House structure is fairly clear from an
examination of the caucus

rules.

Pivotal minorities who seek to defect from the

procedural

equilibrium to which the party agrees before
the Congress starts,
presumably because they dislike the policy
equilibrium thereby
.induced, are to some extent deterred by a threat
that they will
be expelled (or that the party will
The threat is not

splinter).

entirely incredible because the Caucus as a
corporate actor has
much to lose —- its value as a forum
within which long-term
policy deals can be consummated
should it give in to cheating

--

by pivotal factions on structural

issues: and because individual

legislators within the Caucus also have
much to lose--the policy
at stake, other policies that would be
susceptible to change were

a precedent

for circumventing structure established, and
some

portion of their electorally
valuable reputation for fighting for
certain policies.

The caucus rules may also be useful
in clarifying the "rules
of

reciprocity".

It has often been claimed that legislators

trade votes on policy and support for
structure.

It is hard to

trade long-term support for specific policies,
because there is

2'?

always the question of what amendment constitutes a

support, and what is

factions trade

consequences
the

small

procedural

change in

In contrast, if

support, the ultimate legislative

are less clear,

trade is made quite

reciprocity,

enough to be allowed.

big

but what

clear.

constitutes a violation of

Thus, formal models of

such as Diermeier's, should perhaps focus on

structure rather

than policy.
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